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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court, which had original jurisdiction 
over this case pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3) j, transferred this case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals under U.C.A. 78-2-2(4). This Court 
has jurisdiction of the above-captioned case pursuant to U.C.A. 78-
2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1 
Should the lower court have granted B.W. Norton 
Manufacturing Company, Inc.'s (,,Norton/s") motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that Appellant National Services Industries, 
Inc. (MNSIM) failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 4-501 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration? 
ISSUE #2 
Does NSI have standing to appeal from summary judgment 
granted in favor of a non-adverse co-defendant? 
ISSUE #3 
Did the lower court correctly hold that Norton is a 
component part manufacturer? 
ISSUE #4 
Did the lower court correctly hold that Norton's component 
parts were not in a defective condition when they left Norton? 
ISSUE #5 
Did the lower court correctly hold that component part 
manufacturers have no duty to anticipate how their parts might be 
assembled into final products or to warn end users of possible 
dangers associated with such final products? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES 
Because the trial court decided these issues as a matter of 
law, this court should review the trial court's conclusions for 
correctness. State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.1991) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NORTON SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE NSI FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
In the proceedings below, Norton filed its motion for 
summary judgment on March 21, 1994, and NSI's response was due on 
or before March 31, 1994. [Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration.] NSI filed its response on April 12, 1994, almost 
two weeks late and after Norton had already filed a notice to 
submit its motion for summary judgment for decision. Because NSI 
failed to comply with Rule 4-501, this court should affirm summary 
judgment for Norton on the basis that it was unopposed below and 
NSI's opposition was never properly raised. 
II. NSI LACKS STANDING TO APPEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN 
FAVOR OF NORTON 
It is well-settled that a party has no standing to appeal 
from judgment granted in favor of a non-adverse party. NSI and 
Norton were co-defendants below. When NSI settled with plaintiff 
(the only party adverse to NSI), it resolved the only dispute in 
which it was involved. NSI was never adverse to Norton, and 
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therefore lacks standing to appeal from summary judgment granted in 
Norton's favor. 
III. NORTON IS A MANUFACTURER OF COMPONENT PARTS 
Norton manufactures component parts from which a variety of 
containers of different characteristics may be constructed. 
Norton's only duty, unless informed of any specific requirements by 
the customer, is to provide non-defective component parts. In 
purchasing Norton parts to build their containers, NSI did not 
inform Norton of any specific requirements the finished containers 
must meet or otherwise consult Norton at any stage in the process. 
Norton's only duty, therefore, was to provide non-defective 
component parts. 
IV. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY NORTON PART WAS DEFECTIVE 
There is simply no evidence in the record to even suggest 
that any Norton part was defective when it left Norton. NSI quotes 
extensively from the deposition testimony of Dr. Noel de Nevers in 
attempting to demonstrate that a factual question exists as to 
whether Norton sold defective products. Dr. de Nevers, however, 
never expressed an opinion that any Norton product was defective. 
Additionally, NSI's own representative has stated that he has no 
information indicating that parts supplied by Norton were 
defective. As the lower court correctly noted: M[e]ngineers from 
NSI had no opinion that the steel pail components were defective. 
No expert in the case has rendered such an opinion." (R. p.253, 1. 
19-21). 
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V. NORTON, AS A MANUFACTURER OF NON-DEFECTIVE COMPONENT PARTS, 
OWED NO DUTY TO WARN PLAINTIFF OF DANGERS WHICH AROSE 
THROUGH THE INCORPORATION OF NORTON PARTS INTO A CONTAINER 
IMPROPERLY DESIGNED BY A THIRD PARTY 
Given the lack of evidence in the record suggesting 
Norton's parts were defective, the lower court correctly held that 
"under the circumstances . . . Norton did not have a duty to warn11 
plaintiff of dangers which arose through a third party's faulty 
design of an end product constructed of Norton parts. (R. p.254, 
1. 2-3) . Norton is not chargeable with anticipating how its parts 
might be assembled into containers designed by others. Norton had 
no duty to warn plaintiff of any dangers posed due to a third 
party's failure to purchase the proper parts to construct a 
container of a certain design. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
NORTON BECAUSE NSI FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
In the proceedings below, Norton filed its motion for 
summary judgment on March 21, 1994. NSI's response to that motion 
was due on or before March 31, 1994. [Rule 4-501, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration.] NSI did not file its memorandum in 
opposition to Norton's motion for summary judgment until April 12, 
1994, after Norton had already filed a notice to submit its motion 
for summary judgment for decision. Because NSI failed to comply 
with Rule 4-501, the lower court should have granted Norton's 
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motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was unopposed. 
Because Norton's summary judgment motion went unopposed in the 
proceedings below and NSI's opposition to Norton's summary judgment 
was never properly raised, this court should affirm summary 
judgment for Norton. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT NSI, AFTER SETTLING WITH THE ONLY PARTY 
ADVERSE TO IT, IS NO LONGER IN THIS CASE AND HAS 
NO STANDING TO APPEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN 
FAVOR OF A NONADVERSE CO-DEFENDANT 
In the proceeding below, Norton moved for summary judgment. 
After hearing argument from both Norton and NSI, the court granted 
Norton's motion for summary judgment, holding that Norton was a 
component part manufacturer whose component parts were not defec-
tive and that Norton therefore had no duty to warn plaintiff. NSI 
thereafter settled with plaintiff. 
NSI now attempts to appeal the summary judgment granted its 
co-defendant Norton. NSI, however, having never filed a crossclaim 
against Norton, was never adverse to Norton. NSI therefore lacks 
standing to appeal the summary judgment granted in favor of Norton. 
That a party cannot appeal from a judgment granted in favor 
of a nonadverse party is well-settled: 
It is hornbook law that *a party may only appeal 
to protect its own interests, and not those of a 
coparty.' Stevenson, simply as co-defendant, may 
not appeal the dismissal of an additional 
defendant from Morrison-Knudsen's original claims, 
without itself being a party-plaintiff to those 
claims. This is so despite Stevenson's assertion 
that its position may be affected in some way by 
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the ultimate resolution of Morrison-Knudsen's 
claims against FSLIC. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co, v. CHG Int'l. Inc>, 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 (9th 
Cir. 1987). See also Stockstill v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 888 F.2d 
1493 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that employer, which did not file any 
claim against co-defendant, did not have standing to appeal 
dismissal of co-defendant from action). 
The case of Justice v. CSX Transportation. Inc., 908 F.2d 
119 (7th Cir. 1990), involving facts nearly identical to those of 
the instant case, clearly illustrates this well-settled principle 
of law. In CSX, two co-defendant railroads, CSX and Amtrak, 
settled with the plaintiff, the only party that had filed any claim 
against them. The defendant railroads then attempted to appeal 
from summary judgment granted in favor of a third co-defendant 
(farm bureau) against whom they had never filed a crossclaim in the 
underlying action. CSX thus presented a procedural situation 
identical to that of the instant case. 
In holding that the appellants had no standing to appeal 
from summary judgment granted in favor of a co-defendant below, the 
CSX court made several observations which are also applicable to 
the instant case: 
The railroads were brought into this case by the 
plaintiff, and could have filed a cross-claim 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) against the bureau, 
seeking indemnification in the event that they 
were forced or agreed to pay the whole or any part 
of the plaintiff's claim; and then their presence 
in the case would have survived their settlement 
with plaintiff. But they did not file a cross-
claim. Their only status in the case was as 
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defendants. When they settled with the plaintiff 
they resolved the only contest in which they were 
involved. 
Id. at 125. The CSX court held that appellants had no standing to 
appeal the summary judgment granted to their co-defendant below: 
[A] party cannot appeal from a judgment after it 
has settled with the only party that had filed a 
claim against it or against which it had filed a 
claim. A party cannot appeal from the judgment 
entered in favor of a nonadverse party, and having 
failed to file a cross claim against the farm 
bureau the railroads were not adversaries of the 
bureau and could not appeal from a judgment in its 
favor. These are large, experienced, and legally 
sophisticated enterprises, and it is time they 
learned to play by the rules. More than a 
technical point is at stake; the other parties 
were entitled to assume that the settlement had 
removed the railroads from any further proceeding 
in the case. We dismiss the railroad's appeal. 
Id. 
The instant case presents the identical situation. NSI was 
brought into the case by plaintiff and NSI's only status was as a 
defendant. When NSI settled with plaintiff it resolved the only 
controversy in which it was involved. NSI could have filed a 
cross-claim against Norton, thereby making itself adverse to Norton 
and giving itself standing to appeal a summary judgment granted in 
favor of Norton. NSI, however, failed to file any cross-claim. 
NSI and Norton were never adverse parties and NSI simply cannot, 
after settling out of the case, appeal the summary judgment granted 
in favor of a nonadverse party. 
Appellant argues that "the open courts provision, due 
process, and equal protection require that NSI be given a *full and 
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fair opportunity' to litigate the issues of Norton's proportionate 
fault, including indemnity owed by Norton." Appellants Brief at 
43• Yet, far from being deprived of such an opportunity, NSI had 
every occasion to file a cross-claim against Norton in the 
underlying action. It simply failed to do so. 
No injustice capable of repetition has occurred as NSI 
suggests. NSI states that lf[u]nder the trial judges interpretation 
of Sullivan [853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993)], plaintiff's council can 
build a case against the weakest defendant, stand by idly while 
other defendants move for summary judgment, and force the remaining 
defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's proportionate share of 
the verdict." Appellant's Brief at 45. This contention is absurd. 
A defendant's opportunity to assert claims against a co-defendant 
to avoid paying that co-defendant's proportionate share of an award 
is never placed at the mercy of a plaintiff's choice of which 
defendant to prosecute more vigorously. This is what cross-claims 
under Rule 14(a) are for. NSI was afforded every opportunity to 
assert its claims for indemnity against Norton in this case and 
simply failed to avail itself of these opportunities. Having now 
settled with the plaintiff, NSI simply cannot appeal the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of a nonadverse co-defendant. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON IS A 
COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURER RATHER THAN A 
MANUFACTURER OF FINISHED CONTAINERS 
Even if NSI had standing to appeal from the summary 
judgment granted in favor of Norton, this court should affirm the 
summary judgment granted below. The lower court correctly held 
that Norton manufactured only "component parts" with which 
containers could be assembled. (R. p.252, 1. 20-21). Norton is in 
the business of selling steel pails and lids of different varieties 
which can be used by Norton's customers to make containers of 
different characteristics depending on their needs. Norton sold 
parts to NSI without knowledge of the uses to which NSI intended to 
put such parts. As the court below correctly noted, "NSI did not 
consult with Norton concerning what product they would place in the 
pail and as a matter of practice, NSI would package their own 
product in the pail, close the container, apply a warning label 
authored by NSI to the container and would ship the product to an 
NSI customer without consulting with Norton at any step in that 
process." (R. p.253, 1. 2-6) 
Only NSI knew what characteristics the container it was 
assembling would need to have. This is so because "Norton was 
never advised by NSI that the steel pail and components shipped to 
NSI would contain . . . vapor pressure in the head space." (R. 
p.253, 1. 15-17). If NSI had kept Norton better informed, Norton 
could have sold NSI different lids which could accommodate vapor 
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pressure in the container. However, because NSI did not consult 
with Norton, it was NSI's responsibility to ensure that the parts 
it purchased were appropriate for their intended purpose, and it 
was NSI/s responsibility to warn its customers of any danger which 
the assembled container filled with their product might present. 
NSI states that "NSI specifies a certain size of container, 
type of lid, color, etc, just as one might specify options on a 
car." However, specifying the type of pail and lid to be sent is 
nothing like specifying optional features on a car, but rather 
determines the purposes for which a container assembled of such 
parts can safely be used. If NSI had indicated that any pressure 
would be present in the container they intended to assemble, Norton 
could have sold them a "type of lid" which would safely accommodate 
such pressure. Only NSI knew the uses to which the ultimate 
container would be put and it was their responsibility in assem-
bling such a container to order the appropriate parts. Norton is 
not chargeable with ensuring that containers assembled of its parts 
are not put to uses which place undue demands on any single 
component. 
NSI cites several "container" cases holding "container 
manufacturers" liable for manufacturing defective containers which 
do not perform the job they were designed for. These cases are 
inapposite. The cases cited by NSI all involve manufacturers of 
finished, assembled containers sold for a known purpose, and do not 
address the "component parts" issue. 
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NSI cites the Utah case of Palmer v. Wasatch Chemical 
Companyf 353 P.2d 985 (Utah 1960). Palmer, however, involved a 
defective finished container delivered to plaintiff filled with 
acid. Id. at 986. The container was a one-piece carboy (glass 
bottle), not constructed of component parts at all. Additionally, 
the plaintiff in that case brought suit only against the seller of 
the product contained within the carboy for its failure to exercise 
ordinary care in inspecting the container and delivering its 
product. Id. at 985. The manufacturer of the carboy was not a 
defendant, and no defense involving "component part" law was ever 
raised. Palmer simply never addressed the "component parts" issue 
or any other issue relevant to this appeal. 
NSI also cites the case of Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.. 714 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1987). Again, Van Duzer involved 
a glass Canada Dry bottle not constructed of any component parts. 
No "component part" argument was ever raised by the parties or 
addressed by the court. 
Norton did not sell a "container" to NSI, but components 
with which NSI constructed a container. NSI's citation of cases 
involving finished, completed containers, in which the issue of 
"component parts" was never raised or addressed, does nothing to 
support NSI's assertion that "Norton's pail and lid were not 
*component parts,' but were completed 'containers.'" Brief of 
Appellant at 21. Norton is not a "container manufacturer," and the 
cases cited by NSI are inapplicable. 
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The lower court correctly held that Norton was the manufac-
turer of the "component parts" of the pail. (R. p.252, 1. 20-21) 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON'S 
COMPONENT PARTS WERE NOT DEFECTIVE 
NSI states that the "lower court erred when it held that 
Norton owed no duty to provide a safe product . . . [a]nyone who 
sells a defective product is subject to liability for injuries 
caused by that defective product." Brief of Appellant at 12. NSI, 
however, has misread the courts holding. The court below never 
held that Norton had no duty to ensure its parts were not defec-
tive. Rather, the court correctly held that Norton's components in 
fact were not defective, and Norton therefore had no duty to warn 
plaintiff of dangers which might arise through another company's 
use of its components. (R. p.253, 1. 19 to p.254, 1. 3) 
There is no dispute that Norton has a duty to ensure that 
its components are not defective. There is no evidence to suggest, 
however, that Norton breached this duty. NSI argues that expert 
testimony in this case creates a factual question as to whether 
Norton's products were in a defective condition. NSI attempts to 
rely on the deposition testimony of Dr. Noel de Nevers in this 
regard. Dr. de Nevers, however, never expressed an opinion that 
any of Norton's parts were defective, and NSI can cite to no 
portion of Dr. de Nevers deposition to support this contention. 
Additionally, NSI's own representative has testified that he has no 
information indicating that there was anything wrong with the parts 
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supplied by Norton. [Deposition of Dr. Fineman, pp.5, 81-82.] As 
the lower court correctly noted: "[e]ngineers from NSI had no 
opinion that the steel pail components were defective. No expert 
in the case rendered such opinion." (R. p.253, 1. 19-21.) 
There is simply no evidence in the instant case that the 
component parts were in a defective condition when they left 
Norton. 
NSI's allegations that the "container in the current case 
was, in and of itself, dangerous," or that there is a factual 
question of the "container being defective" do nothing to undermine 
the lower court's grant of summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at 
28, 34. As the court below correctly noted, Norton did not 
manufacture the "container," but rather manufactured a variety of 
"component parts" with which different containers could be made by 
other parties. (R. p.252, 1. 20-21.) If the "container" in this 
case was unreasonably dangerous for the purpose for which it was 
used, it is because NSI did not inform Norton of its specific needs 
or itself ensure that the proper pail and lid were purchased to 
construct an appropriate container. There is no evidence that 
Norton manufactured or sold any defective part and there is 




THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON, AS A 
COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURER, HAD NO DUTY TO 
ANTICIPATE HOW ITS COMPONENT PARTS MIGHT BE 
ASSEMBLED BY OTHERS INTO FINAL PRODUCTS OR TO WARN 
OF DANGERS WHICH ARISE THROUGH IMPROPER DESIGN OF 
SUCH PRODUCTS BY THIRD PARTIES 
Given the absence of evidence in the record suggesting 
Norton's component parts were in any way defective, the lower court 
correctly held that "under the circumstances . . . Norton did not 
have a duty to warn" plaintiff of any danger he might have 
encountered. (R. p.254, 1. 2-3) This is so because any danger 
present arose not because any Norton product was unsafe, but 
because non-defective Norton parts were incorporated into a 
container of faulty design. 
Norton sold to NSI components with which a container could 
be made. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that these 
parts were defective. A manufacturer of non-defective component 
parts cannot be held liable for injury caused by another party's 
incorporation of such components into a defectively designed 
ultimate product. See Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 
1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 811 
F.Supp 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992); Cropper v Reao Distribution Center. 
Inc.. 542 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1982). Thus, the manufacturer of 
non-defective component parts has no duty to anticipate dangers 
which might arise through another party's misuse of its components 
in some end product, and no duty to warn users of such end products 
of these dangers. As the Sperry court noted, [t]o hold a component 
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part manufacturer liable in such a situation would *cast it in the 
role of insurer./M Sperry. 786 F.Supp. at 517 (citation omitted). 
In the instant caser the lower court correctly noted that 
there had been no evidence presented that the parts manufactured by 
Norton were in any way defective. (R. p.253, 1. 19-21.) Order 
granting Summary Judgment at 3-4. In view of the fact that 
Norton's products were not defective, the court below correctly 
held that "Norton did not have a duty to warn" plaintiff of dangers 
present due to a third parties use of the wrong components in 
assembling a container. (R. p.254, 1. 2-3.) 
NSI, in its brief, states that the "lower court erred when 
it held that Norton owed no duty to provide a safe product . . . 
[a]nyone who sells a defective product is subject to liability for 
injuries caused by that defective product." Brief of Appellant at 
12. NSI then argues that cases relied on by Norton never held that 
component part manufacturers have no duty to sell non-defective 
products, only that the products in those particular cases were not 
in fact defective. Brief of Appellant at 17. 
NSI, however, has completely missed the point. There is no 
dispute that Norton had a duty not to manufacture and sell 
defective parts. The court below certainly never held that no such 
duty was owed, and Norton has never taken this position. Rather, 
the court below held that Norton's products in fact were not 
defective, and that under these "circumstances . . . Norton did not 
have a duty to warn." (R. p.254, 1. 2-3) (emphasis added). 
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Norton's duty was to sell non-defective parts and Norton discharged 
this duty. 
The dispute here is whether a manufacturer of parts which 
are not defective has a duty to warn individuals of possible 
dangers associated with products negligently manufactured from such 
parts. The court below correctly applied the law in holding that 
no such duty is owed. 
NSI's arguments with regard to Norton's duty to manufacture 
non-defective parts may be accepted as true without undermining the 
lower court's grant of summary judgment. The lower court never 
held that Norton owed no duty to ensure its parts were not 
defective, and did not base its grant of summary judgment on such 
a conclusion. The court below held only that, given the lack of 
evidence that Norton's parts were defective, Norton had no duty to 
anticipate how its parts might be used or to warn plaintiff of 
possible dangers presented by a container assembled by another 
party. The duty to warn of any danger presented by the completed 
pail assembled by NSI of Norton parts rested squarely with NSI. 
Norton discharged the only duty it owed to plaintiff: to ensure 
that the component parts it manufactured were not in and of 
themselves defective. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well-settled that a party has no standing to appeal 
from a judgment granted in favor of another non-adverse party. 
When NSI settled with plaintiff, it resolved the only dispute in 
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which it was involved. NSI lacks standing to appeal from summary 
judgment granted in favor of Norton, a non-adverse co-defendant. 
Even if NSI had standing to appeal from the summary 
judgment granted Norton, NSI has failed to demonstrate that any 
issue of facts exists which would preclude summary judgment in this 
case. The lower court's grant of summary judgment was premised on 
the fact that there had been absolutely no evidence offered that 
any of the products supplied by Norton were defective. Any 
dangerous condition encountered by plaintiff in this case resulted 
from NSI's failure to order the proper parts with which to build an 
appropriate container for its product. Norton is not chargeable 
with ensuring that purchasers of Norton parts use those parts to 
construct containers appropriate for their intended uses. There is 
simply no evidence in this case to suggest that any Norton part was 
defective when sold. 
For the foregoing reasons, NSI's appeal of the summary 
judgment granted in favor of Norton should be dismissed and 
Norton's summary judgment affirmed. 
Dated this ^^T^P day of May>ol995. 
STRONG A HANNI 
M. Belrts 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael S. Johnson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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